Is Trump copying the worst Latin American autocrats?

Executive orders, clashes with judges, cronyism, states of emergency and the undermining of institutions are all classic traits of Latin American autocrats yet Trump is deploying all of them, writes William Lee, Director of business intelligence consultancy, SecureValue…

Common wisdom has generally held that Latin America was trying—and often failing—to emulate the success of the United States. So, it has been bizarre to see that wisdom turned on its head in recent months as US president Donald Trump borrows from the Latin American political playbook.

The Latin American autocrat’s playbook

You don’t need to look into Latin America’s distant past for examples. The presidents of Venezuela and Nicaragua did not come to power via the military coups or Marxist revolutions that characterised Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s former president, was elected democratically before he started dismantling the country’s key institutions, cowing the press and opposition and nationalising key industries. Nicolas Maduro simply accelerated this and, with checks on executive power all but destroyed, can now manipulate elections and arrest opposition politicians at will.  

Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega was democratically elected in 2006 before doing away with term limits, brutally suppressing anti-government protests, intimidating the opposition and cracking down on the independent media. Nayib Bukele, El Salvador’s popular president, is set to govern for another five years with near-total control of parliament and other state institutions after a landslide election victory in February 2024. He was only able to seek re-election after a pliant Supreme Court ruling allowed him to bypass a constitutional ban on successive terms.

Looking further back, the PRI party managed to govern Mexico as a one-party state for the majority of the 20^th century through a combination of electoral fraud, corporatism and political repression. Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori was democratically elected in 1990, before dissolving Congress in 1992 and taking on full legislative and judicial powers.  

Are US institutions too strong for a dictator?

These are extreme examples, involving countries that are structurally, politically and historically very different to the US. Institutions in the US are also far stronger. They withstood the January 6^th, 2021, crisis and have proved robust in the past, Watergate possibly being the best example. But the prevailing sentiment against elites, as well as a growing suspicion of traditional politicians, provide fertile ground for authoritarianism and a lack of resistance to a steady erosion of institutional capacity.

Opinion polling in recent years reflects this. The Pew Research Center carried out a survey in 2024 that found that a median 31% of respondents across 24 nations were supportive of authoritarian systems. The share was 32% for US respondents.

A number of Trump’s early moves raise red flags: the flurry of executive orders; picking fights with the judiciary; replacing staff within the federal bureaucracy with loyalists (reports suggest some potential new hires were asked if they believe Biden legitimately won the 2021 election); defunding and talking down key government institutions; targeting and stoking hatred towards specific groups, such as celebrities and a poorly defined "woke" elite. Add to this Trump’s long-standing love of harassing the press, claiming a direct mandate from the people and bypassing Congress wherever possible.

Economic impact of Trump’s populism

Perhaps the most likely constraint will be economic. Despite Elon Musk’s high-profile campaign to cut government spending, Trump’s first term was marked by public spending and widening deficits. And it is in this area that the strains within his coalition are the clearest: one part led by Musk and his acolytes want to cut deficits and shrink government, while the Trump’s  MAGA base is motivated by economic nationalism and  improving living standards in left behind parts of the country.

In their essay the Macroeconomics of Populism, Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, note that the end result of populist policymaking tends to be “galloping inflation, crisis, and the collapse of the economic system”. Although the US economy, backed by the world’s reserve currency, is more resilient than Latin America, inflation expectations have already risen. This has been reflected by the slowing pace of interest rate cuts by the US Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the performance of the stock market, which is sensitive to a longer-than-anticipated periods of higher rates, is an obsession for Trump.

it has been bizarre to see that wisdom turned on its head in recent months as US president Donald Trump borrows from the Latin American political playbook

Reflecting on what he would prefer to be reincarnated as, political strategist James Carville famously said he would choose to come back as the bond market. Given the US’ high debt burden and deficit, which is expected to be 6% of GDP this year, a return of the “bond vigilantes”, as seen in the UK during Liz Truss’ ill-fated administration, could emerge as the strongest check on presidential power.

 A bond and currency sell off combined with a balance of payments crisis was often the final straw that saw government fall in Latin America. So while pundits are reaching back to the extremes of the 1930s for parallels with where the US stands today, the reality may be far closer to home, just across that controversial southern border.