Insecurity in Mexico: a troubled past and a bumpy road ahead

A challenging sexenio 

Claudia Sheinbaum took office on 1 October, succeeding former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO, 2018-24) – both members of the ruling National Regeneration Movement (Morena). Sheinbaum inherits a security situation that has been on a steady decline for years. Since former president Felipe Calderón (2006-12) “kicked the hornets’ nest” in 2006 by declaring war on organised crime groups (OCGs) and deploying the military to combat them, these groups have driven violence and become increasingly sophisticated, with substantial technical, financial and logistical resources.   

AMLO’s security strategy exacerbated the already considerable levels of violence he inherited. His approach centred around addressing the social causes of crime (embodied in the slogan “hugs, not bullets”) and the militarisation of public security via the National Guard. Under this strategy, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) followed the Sinaloa Cartel in becoming a massive organisation, while small groups grew and new ones emerged. 

OCG links with politicians and security forces at all levels of government have compounded matters by fostering impunity. In addition, chronic institutional deficiencies in law enforcement agencies and the lack of local police presence have resulted in only 1% of crimes being prosecuted in Mexico – according to the Centre for the Study of Impunity and Justice (CESIJ)’s Global Impunity Index. Consequently, OCGs have spread their operations to 81% of municipalities, turning once-peaceful states into battlegrounds. The result: the most violent sexenio (six-year presidential term) in modern history, with nearly 200,000 homicides (80% of them related to OCGs), 1,201 politically motivated murders and likely more than 100,000 people missing. 

A hornets’ nest 

Growing profits over the past three years from drug and human trafficking have intensified competition among the plethora of OCGs across Mexico. This trend has mainly been driven by the following developments: 

• The ease and low cost of producing and trafficking fentanyl, which is matched by steep prices and rapidly rising demand for the drug in the US 

• High levels of migration to the US, which have increased opportunities for the trafficking and financial exploitation of migrants 

• The explosion of profits for criminal groups involved in financial blackmail rackets against legitimate industries like mining and street-level retail 

Criminal dynamics have become as complex as ever as rivals vie to control valuable states for these activities. This prompts frequent clashes, abductions, roadblocks and explosive attacks in disputed areas – many of which occur in states of strategic importance for business (such as Baja California, the State of México, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas and Veracruz). 

At the forefront of the now-tangled criminal landscape is the intense turf war taking place between the two nationally dominant OCGs: the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG. Violence between them has spread to nearly all parts of the country. The CJNG operates in 28 states and the Sinaloa Cartel in 24, with relevant overlaps (18 are being disputed between the two).

The main battleground states for controlling drug and human trafficking are Chiapas, Baja California, Zacatecas, the State of México, Quintana Roo and Guerrero. This rivalry is matched in equal measure by several other turf wars (see map above) that contribute to significant violence across the country. 

In addition to inter-OCG disputes, Mexico’s deteriorating security environment is also driven by escalating internal conflicts. The most notable case is the war between rival Sinaloa Cartel factions. Los Chapitos, the faction led by the sons of Joaquin Guzmán Loera (alias “El Chapo”), and Los Mayos – led by Ismael Zambada García (alias “El Mayo”) – had been engaged in a partially “cold” war until the last few months. Their conflict reached a boiling point on 25 July, when Los Chapitos abducted and handed Zambada to US law enforcement agencies. Since then, violence between the factions has raged in Sinaloa state, paralysing day-to-day business operations, especially in the state capital Culiacán. This is an extreme but clear example of how insecurity impacts companies in Mexico. 

Cautious optimism? 

Sheinbaum’s strategy preserves much of her predecessor’s, though with notable deviations. These raise the likelihood that there will be at least some meaningful improvements to the security environment: 

• There are clear targets to reduce homicide and financial blackmail, which will give direction to the strategy and increase accountability.  

• The strategy targets states that are hotspots for organised crime and drive violence levels nationally. This will somewhat reverse AMLO’s wholly reactive approach – which dampened the flame but never put the fire out.  

• There is a renewed focus on improving institutional capabilities at the state and municipal levels. This centres around enhancing intelligence to undermine OCGs, especially their finances.  

• The strategy also aims to professionalise state and municipal police forces and increase federal-state coordination and intelligence sharing – a realistic goal, as Morena now governs two-thirds of Mexico’s states. 

In addition, Security Minister Omar García Harfuch comes into his role with a strong record from his time in charge of the Citizen Security Ministry (SSC) in Mexico City (2018-24). During his tenure, there was a drop in homicides and other crimes (like financial blackmail and violent robbery). His strategy reflects much of the above and he has surrounded himself with a capable team to achieve these goals. Being politically ambitious, he will likely see this as a potential platform from which to launch a presidential bid down the line. However, getting results at the national level will be far more challenging for Harfuch than it was in Mexico City given the variety of criminal dynamics in each state. Moreover, inherent institutional shortcomings persist. Security forces are often poorly trained and ill-equipped, and corruption is rife among them. 

Business implications 

A key driver of increased security risk in Mexico is the more predatory behaviour of OCGs towards the private sector. Not only do OCGs demonstrate the intent to target legitimate companies for crimes like extortion and cargo theft, but they also have the sophistication to do so – which results in brazen crimes targeting key strategic sectors.

The following risks have increased in the past 12 months:  

• Financial blackmail risks have risen significantly. The mining, beverage and agricultural sectors are the most affected.  

• Cargo theft has skyrocketed. This poses considerable operational and security challenges, particularly for manufacturing, mining and logistics companies. 

• Fuel theft (known as huachicoleo) has become widespread, resulting in considerable financial losses for the energy sector. 

• Carjacking, particularly of SUVs and lorries. This is a major security threat in violence hotspots. 

60% of companies operating in Mexico feel somewhat or considerably affected by crime, according to a survey from 2023 by the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham). Businesses are often unable to rely on the security forces to ensure the safety of personnel and integrity of assets. AmCham reports that 58% of firms in the country are investing between 2% and 10% of their annual budgets in security measures.

Barring any drastic change, Mexico’s security risk will remain high for the remainder of 2024 and throughout 2025. That said, major reductions in murders, financial blackmail and road insecurity could improve the security environment – but it will be a bumpy path forward. The situation will likely worsen before it improves.

Author: Joe Beckford, Joe Beckford, Analyst on Control Risks’ political, operational and security risk analysis and forecasting team, based in Mexico City.